We Can No Longer Afford The Cost Of War—Notes

The Urgency of Understanding the Economic Costs of Modern War

We have thousands of books and studies examining humanity's challenges in the 21st Century. You can visit my book recommendation page for a short list. There are thousands of books and studies focused on war and warfare.

We can’t afford War anymore. Unfortunately, the USA is a belligerent beast. It would have been better if, fifteen years ago, the USA had focused on diplomacy and building relationships with countries rather than nation-building and forcing countries to follow its rules. “Full Spectrum Dominance” is a terrible strategy in the Twenty-First Century.

BACKGROUND

Please read about the history of the region, Russia and Ukraine. (more books for context building)

"The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine" by Serhii Plokhy

“Russia and Ukraine” by Myroslav Shkandrij

“The Russian Empire” by Dominic Lieven

"Ukraine: A History" by Orest Subtelny

"Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine" by Anne Applebaum

"Russia: A Short History" by Ronald Hingley

"The Russian Revolution" by Richard Pipes

"The History of Russia" by Orlando Figes

"Midnight in Chernobyl: The Untold Story of the World's Greatest Nuclear Disaster" by Adam Higginbotham

"The Balkans: A Short History" by Mark Mazower

"Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, and Friends" by Lonnie Johnson

“Orientalism” by Edward Said: A seminal work that critiques the way the West has constructed a romanticized and often demeaning view of the East. It explores how this "Orientalist" perspective has been used to justify colonialism and imperialism.

“Culture and Imperialism” by Edward Said: A follow-up to "Orientalism" that examines how literature and culture have been used to support or resist imperial power. It analyzes works by writers from both colonizing and colonized societies.

“The Wretched of the Earth” by Frantz Fanon: A powerful critique of colonialism and its psychological effects on both the colonized and the colonizer. It explores the violence and dehumanization inherent in colonial systems.

“Postcolonial Theory: A Very Short Introduction” by Robert J.C. Young: A concise overview of the key concepts and debates in postcolonial theory. It explores the legacy of colonialism and its ongoing impact on identity, culture, and power relations.

"The Russian Complex: The Ideas of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Solzhenitsyn" by Vladimir Golstein

From Reality With Love

PATRICK LAWRENCE: Trump 2.0 Crosses the Atlantic

Russia Out of the Cold

Trump seems to have done a lot of thinking during his four years in the political wilderness. A week of exceptional events, each adding more surprise to those preceding it, indicates that Trump and those around him now propose to transcend altogether the binaries Washington has enforced since it assumed its position of global primacy in the late 1940s. Russia is to come in from the cold and the Atlantic is to grow wider. 

In this context, extricating the U.S. from the Ukraine quagmire is more than a footnote but nothing like the main attraction.  Assuming all goes to Trump’s apparent plan — and we must make this assumption with unsparing caution — the center-stage attraction is discarding what has passed for a world order since the 1945 victories. 

To be noted immediately: Sending the ancien régime into the history texts is not the same as constructing a new order to replace it. At this early moment it is not clear whether Trump and his people have an idea for one; yet more doubtful is whether he or any of his people would be up to a project of this world-historical magnitude. 

Whatever the future may hold, and seldom does it present such promise and peril as now, Trump and his new cabinet appointees on the national-security side set a lot of wheels in motion last week. A little oddly — a coordination problem here? — Pete Hegseth, the Fox News presenter turned defense secretary, got them rolling last Wednesday morning, some hours before Trump announced his instantly famous telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin. 

At a speech in Brussels before NATO defense ministers and various senior Ukrainian officials, Hegseth followed Trump’s habit of bringing several longstanding unsayables into the sphere of the sayable. Retaking land Russian forces now occupy — Crimea, of course, but also sections of eastern Ukraine now formally incorporated into the Russian Federation — is “an unrealistic objective… an illusory goal.” 

In addition — a couple of other big ones — Hegseth said the U.S. will not support Ukraine’s desire to join NATO; neither will Article 5 of the NATO charter — an attack on one member is an attack on all — cover the troops of any NATO member dispatched to Ukraine in any capacity.

By the time he said these things, Hegseth had already surrendered U.S. leadership of what is called the Contact Group, a Biden-era creation comprised of 50–plus nations that manages weapons shipments and humanitarian aid — whatever that may mean at this point — to Kiev. 

Could the defense secretary’s message — the opener for Trump’s very eventful week — be any clearer? The U.S. is stepping back from Ukraine, Biden’s proxy war, and any thought of a NATO role in it. The Europeans are on their own as they contemplate their course in these new circumstances.

Lucky Breaks Paperback – by Yevgenia Belorusets March 1, 2022

"Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia" by Peter Pomerantsev

"Why Do They Hate Russia?" by Vladimir Golstein

Russia and the Western Far Right (Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far Right) by Anton Shekhovtsov

How Russia Went from Ally to Adversary

The Catastrophic Results of Peace (I highly recommend this article. Are we happy with the current “global order.” If so, why are we experiencing so many global problems? We need a new path to discovering what’s next.)

War with Russia?: From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate by Stephen F. Cohen

Testing Assumptions About US Foreign Policy in 2025

There are major questions facing U.S. foreign policy — and the second Trump administration — in 2025. Efforts to resolve conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, relations with China, and global economic challenges will all test the United States and its policymakers. Members of the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy team examined assumptions that they believe are central to U.S. foreign policy and will likely be tested in 2025. Each author identifies and unpacks a key piece of conventional wisdom, and then assesses whether that prevailing view holds up, or whether a fresh approach is needed in light of new realities.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2025

Beyond Ukraine: Russia’s Foreign Policy Challenges in 2025

Putin’s actions on Trump’s inauguration day highlighted Russia's growing security and political concerns, from the Middle East to China and Belarus, with implications for Europe’s future.

President Donald Trump’s inauguration and promises to end the Ukraine war have naturally trained the spotlight back on the three-year conflict. But even if a negotiated end to the war is sought, Russia has several other burgeoning security and political issues that a new US administration may have to contend with. Putin’s behaviour and key events around Trump’s inauguration threw these considerations into sharp relief. 

Putin’s first two acts on the day Trump was sworn in were to have a call with President Xi, and then hold a meeting with his own Security Council. Putin and Xi’s call was more than just symbolic – they went into detail about some of the cargo transport issues between Russia and China, as well as how to engage with the new US administration. For all Putin’s attempts to downplay the importance of Trump’s inauguration, his hawkish Security Council prioritised discussing the potential impact of the new US administration on Middle Eastern stability. And all of this took place against the backdrop of tightly controlled presidential elections in Belarus, where Moscow loyalist and long-serving strongman Alexander Lukashenko extended his presidency by another five years. 

All these discussions and events highlighted three important current areas of foreign policy concern for Russia: its ability to project military and political power in the Middle East since Assad’s removal; its trade relationship with China, upon which its exports depend; and its relationship with client state Belarus, a key player in regional security and in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

The Czar’s Gambit (Highly recommended. For further understanding of Russia’s vision for a Mulit-Polar World I also recommend reading Alexander Dugin. If you don’t want to know what they think, shut up and go fishing.)

What is Russia’s vision for the international order, and does it possess the capabilities to realize it? How long can Russia still incur the staggering costs of its war against Ukraine and other geopolitical endeavors? And how do recent political developments abroad, from the return of US President Donald Trump to the sudden fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, impact Russia?

Ukraine, Multipolarity and the Crisis of Grand Strategies

ABSTRACT

Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has unleashed the largest and most lethal war on the European continent since 1945. Vladimir Putin and the Russian government bear most of the responsibility for the invasion and its terrible humanitarian consequences. However, explanations for the war deriving from Russian domestic political dynamics or Vladimir Putin’s imperial nostalgia do not provide a comprehensive understanding of the crisis that led to war. Situating the crisis and ensuing invasion within the broader historical context of post-Cold War relations, we argue that the war in Ukraine has two main sources. The first is the longstanding Anglo-American grand strategy of NATO consolidation as a vehicle for political and economic domination in Europe. The second is the grand strategy of Russia. Unable to accommodate itself on an equal basis in the new U.S.-led post-Cold War global capitalist order, Russia gradually adopted a geopolitical and nationalistic agenda of confrontation in response to NATO’s seemingly inexorable eastward advance, its increasing participation in ‘out of area’ activities, and the United States’ illegal invasions of Serbia, Iraq, and Libya. The collision of these grand strategies has triggered simultaneously a struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty and independence and a U.S.-Russia proxy war.

Both sides play the Nazi card.

Much Azov about nothing: How the ‘Ukrainian neo-Nazis’ canard fooled the world

The Azov Regiment is frequently invoked to conjure what Russian-Israeli historian Vyacheslav Likhachev calls the “myth [of] Ukrainian fascism”, and many Western press sources in 2022 continue to treat the association between “Azov Regiment/Battalion” and “Neo-Nazi” as axiomatic, with some even attempting to draw unsubstantiated links between Azov and white supremacist terrorists in the West.

The “What about Azov Nazis?” canard has become a ubiquitous tu quoque that Russia deploys to problematise Western support for Ukraine, and distract from its own record of atrocities. Literally meaning “you also” in Latin, this logical fallacy is more informally known as “whataboutism”, and has been deployed in Russian propaganda for decades. In cruder terms, one might recall the playground retort, “I know you are, but what am I?”

Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in Post-Euromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the “Azov” Battalion in 2014

ABSTRACT

During and after Ukraine’s celebrated Euromaydan (literally: European Square) Revolution of 2013–2014, a whole number of novel Ukrainian political and societal phenomena emerged. One of the most intriguing was the relatively spontaneous and government-supported emergence of volunteer armed units from late spring 2014 onwards, in connection with the start of Russia’s covert paramilitary intervention in Eastern Ukraine. Among the most widely noted of these initially irregular detachments was the “Azov” battalion or regiment, named after the Azov Sea, created, in May 2014, by an obscure lunatic fringe group of racist activists. This paper briefly sketches the origins of Azov, biographies of some of its founders, and particulars of its creation, without touching upon such issues as Azov’s military performance, later integration into the National Guard under Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, and political development after 2014.

Moving ‘red lines’: The Russian–Ukrainian war and the pragmatic (mis-)use of international law

ABSTRACT

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has widely been seen as a failure of the international legal order, which could neither stop Russia from launching a war of aggression, nor prevent the perpetration of international crimes. In such a reading, great power politics have (once again) trumped international law. We argue instead that international law plays a crucial part in the conflict by providing a semantic infrastructure, which the opposing parties use to justify their actions, try to re-draw limits of permissible action and negotiate changing ‘red lines’ with the enemy. Drawing on the notion of lawfare, we show how the pragmatic (mis-)use of international law flexibly delineates boundaries and stabilizes expectations between adversaries even as they are contested in the current war. We focus on claims about self-determination and self-defence to justify the use of force; categorizations of combatants; and weapons transfers and the status of third states. That international law can be violated or reinterpreted to breaking point does not make it irrelevant. To the contrary, it recalls its important role as a language of conflict and compromise, beyond strictly legalist as well as dismissive realist views.

Chapter 7: Far-Right Extremist Movements Fighting in Ukraine: Implications for Post-Conflict Europe

ABSTRACT (The list of references is robust.)

The participation of far-right groups in the war in Ukraine has been highly publicized and raises questions about how those groups will evolve after the war, especially vis-à-vis the spread of their ideology. Reviewing their ideological and political direction in the post-conflict environment is the aim of this study. The authors investigate the Ukrainian far-right phenomenon: what kind of movements there are, where they come from, and what their role in the conflict has been. This is followed by an assessment of what threat this poses in the broader strategic context of the war and after it will be over. The analysis brings forward two key points. First, groups like these are a product and exponent of political warfare by state actors, featuring as tools for covert action. Second, by incorporating such militias into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian government makes their radical attitudes diminish. Nationalism, even in the extreme spectrum of political ideology, could be a product of the war. Meeting the criteria for integration into the European Union is an important factor stimulating rule-based order and deradicalization processes. Although there are some potentially worrying implications stemming from the prestige gained by their combat record, the far-right will therefore likely continue to remain a fringe phenomenon with small political impact.

War or Peace in Ukraine: US Moves and European Choices

Challenges of Deterrence in a Multipolar World

One of Joe Biden’s last consequential decisions as president was allowing Ukraine to strike deep within Russia using advanced American missile technology. This action marked a significant step up the escalation ladder. Vladimir Putin has warned that such actions could place Russia on a war footing with NATO. Biden’s risky decision reflects a broader problem of deterrence failure and the absence of military restraint in an increasingly multipolar world. Complicating matters further, Russia’s response—such as deploying advanced missile systems and tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus—signals a significant escalation using more advanced technologies that upend traditional deterrence frameworks.

Challenges of Deterrence in a Multipolar World

Deterrence has long been a cornerstone of international security. Yet in today’s multipolar world, where power is decentralized and alliances are fluid, maintaining effective deterrence is increasingly challenging. This does not mean that multipolarity and deterrence are inherently incompatible. Instead, new deterrence strategies are needed to address the complexities of a gray-zone conflict environment characterized by incrementalism, asymmetrical power dynamics, attribution problems, and rapid technological change.

The foundational works of political scientists like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have shown how multipolar systems reinforce power asymmetries and rapid shifts in alliances. These dynamics also create uncertainty about adversaries’ resolve, complicating risk assessment. Stronger states, less deterred by weaker adversaries, may become emboldened to act aggressively. Moreover, technological advancements such as near-zero-miss precision-guided weapons—including Russia’s hypersonic missiles—make escalatory strategies more tempting. These technologies blur the line between conventional and nuclear strategic doctrines, while emerging capabilities like electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons and drones further complicate military strategy and operations.

Alliance Entrapment and Strategic Discord

In today’s geopolitical landscape, characterized by a multi-nodal world of regional theaters, fundamental shifts in the balance of power rarely result from outright military conquest. While major powers still rely on their conventional forces, they often fail to achieve broader geopolitical goals through the use of force alone. U.S. interventions in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011), as well as Russia’s intervention in Ukraine (2022), highlight this trend.

The divergent priorities and different values among NATO members, EU states, and the United States have complicated efforts to confront Russia. This discord has shifted collective action from deterrence to “compellence” and ultimately to a proxy war. The lack of consensus on end goals and prioritized actions within the Western alliance underscores this challenge. For instance, while the United States expects other NATO members to align with its strategy of opposing Russia, countries like Poland and the UK adopt far more hawkish stances, even courting direct war with Russia. Conversely, Turkey and Hungary pursue multi-aligned strategies to avoid unnecessary confrontation with Moscow. These diverging approaches and a general disregard for the strategic autonomy of member states have enabled more bellicose NATO members to draw reluctant states into a prolonged proxy war with no clear diplomatic resolution — a classic case of alliance entrapment.

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How are any of us helping Ukraine win the War? Where will the next War be? Don’t you think we might want to spend some of our diminishing fossil fuels developing a new energy system rather than on War? But, but, but, PUTLER!

Understanding the cause of the Ukraine war and understanding what motivated Russia to invade Ukraine is not straightforward, and you won’t learn anything absorbing propaganda. Even understanding the motives behind the propaganda is complex. To fully appreciate how complex it is, you’d need a good background in sociology, psychology, political philosophy, contemporary geopolitics, history, anthropology, and many other domains concerning the nature of our species. If you don’t have this kind of deep contextual understanding, be cautious about the types of opinions and reactions you have concerning these horrific events. We are too quickly led into the quagmire and destruction of War.

I won’t go into it here, but if you look at history honestly over the past two thousand years, you’ll see that the systems in “The West” have produced unprecedented violence and numerous genocides. There have been nasty invasions; the Mongolian hoards and the Arab conquests come to mind. Still, many of the invasions didn’t come close to the genocidal madness of conflicts ignited by people of European descent. This itself is a complex subject that will inspire passionate debate, but the mayhem and violence perpetrated by Europeans, for whatever reasons, have been genuinely terrible and destructive. I can’t help but think of The Belgian Congo.

Why do the USA, UK and Europe so hate Russia? How it is that Western antipathy, once thought due to anti-Communism, could be so easily revived over a crisis in distant Ukraine, against a Russia no longer communist? Why does the West accuse Russia of empire-building, when 15 states once part of the defunct Warsaw Pact are now part of NATO, and NATO troops now flank the Russian border? These are only some of the questions Creating Russophobia iinvestigates. Mettan begins by showing the strength of the prejudice against Russia through the Western response to a series of the Uberlingen mid-air collision, the Beslan hostage- taking, the Ossetia War, the Sochi Olympics and the crisis in Ukraine. He then delves into the historical, religious, ideological and geopolitical roots of the detestation of Russia in various European nations over thirteen centuries since Charlemagne competed with Byzantium for the title of heir to the Roman Empire. Mettan examines the geopolitical machinations expressed in those times through the medium of religion, leading to the great Christian schism between Germanic Rome and Byzantium and the European Crusades against Russian Orthodoxy. This history of taboos, prejudices and propaganda directed against the Orthodox Church provides the mythic foundations that shaped Western disdain for contemporary Russia. From the religious and imperial rivalry created by Charlemagne and the papacy to the genesis of French, English, German and then American Russophobia, the West has been engaged in more or less violent hostilities against Russia for a thousand years. Contemporary Russophobia is manufactured through the construction of an anti-Russian discourse in the media and the diplomatic world, and the fabrication and demonization of The Bad Guy, now personified by Vladimir Putin. Both feature in the meta-narrative, the mythical framework of the ferocious Russian bear ruled with a rod of iron by a vicious president. A synthetic reading of all these elements is presented in the light of recent events and in particular of the Ukrainian crisis and the recent American elections, showing how all the resources of the West’s soft power have been mobilized to impose the tale of bad Russia dreaming of global conquest. “By hating Russia, one hurts oneself. Swiss journalist Guy Mettan pieces together the reasons of detestation of the Kremlin and of a rhetoric that goes back to Napoleonic times despite the long list of aggressions perpetrated in the meantime by the West. And he explains why pushing Moscow toward Asia is a very serious error.” —Panorama, Italy “Like Saddam Hussein’s mythical weapons of massive destruction in 2003, Peter the Great’s fake will has been used to justify the aggressions and invasions that the Europeans, and now the Americans, still carry out against Russia.” —Libération, France

Here is a tricky question often debated. What did the United States achieve in the Wars listed below, and was it worth it? War has been a part of the human experience since our species began living in large groups. Some wars have been necessary to achieve one side’s desired objectives, but others arguably have not. Did the United States crash the Soviet Union, or did it crash itself? What did the communist-hating United States achieve in Vietnam, China, and South Korea? Has sabotaging Socialist movements in Central and South America served U.S. interests and made U.S. Americans wealthier, wiser, and healthier? Why do so many U.S. Americans feel they need to carry guns to feel safe and secure? Are people in the United States ever content with how things are going? Why is there so much demand in the USA for hard drugs? Are we taking care of our veterans? How’s “the end of history” going?

The USA is wealthy for many reasons, one of the most significant being geology. It’s also nice to have a big country with many resources flanked by two oceans, Canada and Mexico.

And how about global fossil-fueled modern industrial financialized capitalism (GE after Jack Welch) going? Is our obsession with GDP growth and consumerism sustainable on a finite planet? Are you an accelerationist with maniacal faith in science, engineering, and technology?

In 1981, Jack Welch took over General Electric and quickly rose to fame as the first celebrity CEO. He golfed with presidents, mingled with movie stars, and was idolized for growing GE into the most valuable company in the world. But Welch’s achievements didn’t stem from some greater intelligence or business prowess. Rather, they were the result of a sustained effort to push GE’s stock price ever higher, often at the expense of workers, consumers, and innovation. In this captivating, revelatory book, David Gelles argues that Welch single-handedly ushered in a new, cutthroat era of American capitalism that continues to this day.

Gelles chronicles Welch’s campaign to vaporize hundreds of thousands of jobs in a bid to boost profits, eviscerating the country’s manufacturing base, and destabilizing the middle class. Welch’s obsession with downsizing—he eliminated 10% of employees every year—fundamentally altered GE and inspired generations of imitators who have employed his strategies at other companies around the globe. In his day, Welch was corporate America’s leading proponent of mergers and acquisitions, using deals to gobble up competitors and giving rise to an economy that is more concentrated and less dynamic. And Welch pioneered the dark arts of “financialization,” transforming GE from an admired industrial manufacturer into what was effectively an unregulated bank. The finance business was hugely profitable in the short term and helped Welch keep GE’s stock price ticking up. But ultimately, financialization undermined GE and dozens of other Fortune 500 companies.

Gelles shows how Welch’s celebrated emphasis on increasing shareholder value by any means necessary (layoffs, outsourcing, offshoring, acquisitions, and buybacks, to name but a few tactics) became the norm in American business generally. He demonstrates how that approach has led to the greatest socioeconomic inequality since the Great Depression and harmed many of the very companies that have embraced it. And he shows how a generation of Welch acolytes radically transformed companies like Boeing, Home Depot, Kraft Heinz, and more. Finally, Gelles chronicles the change that is now afoot in corporate America, highlighting companies and leaders who have abandoned Welchism and are proving that it is still possible to excel in the business world without destroying livelihoods, gutting communities, and spurning regulation.

It’s odd to me that MAGA folks who want to lynch Dr. Anthony Fauci also think it’s cool when President Trump invites the Billionaire Silicon Valley Tech Bros to the white house to tout their AI projects, saying that AI will help them develop vaccines to cure every kind of cancer. LOL. I thought those MAGA folks were anti-vaxxers. They discuss Fouci’s conflicts of interest and ignore Musk’s and Trump’s. Missing the contradictions is what we do in our culture. We believe what we want to believe because learning things is too gosh darn hard.

I’m sure most people my age are hoping for business as usual to continue for another twenty years so we can enjoy good returns on capital. Buy low, sell high, mind your timing, get your dividends and capital gains, and enjoy retirement. Every generation has challenges; the youngsters will sort things out. Don’t worry too much about the polycrisis or overshoot; that is just doomist crap.

What motivates various groups to make War is another complex topic. People do it to gain something, that’s for sure. Russian soldiers today are well compensated for risking their lives. Money motivates; let’s leave it at that. Booty, baby, booty. What’s really in it for the United States? Is the USA really all about freedom of speech, liberty, justice, and democracy? Examine its record. How are we doing now? If Biden was so good, how did we get Trump? If Obama was so good, how did we get Trump? If Bush was so good, how did we get Obama? Let’s leave the Deep State out of it.

So, how about the US Wars? Think about each and what the USA and its people got from them. Some got U.S. American folks a lot; some didn’t. Cui bono? I hope you have a good stock and bond portfolio; otherwise, you are missing out. Bigly! Are you a rentier? Are you strategizing for monopoly control of a big, growing market? If you aren’t zero to one, you’re a zero. Wars are fought for many reasons, and profit is the best reason. Is Lindsey Graham right about all the booty in Ukraine? Which is more profitable, selling a billion artillery shells or five F-35? How about a hundred thousand FPV drones?

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18th Century

• American Revolutionary War (1775-1783): The War for independence from British rule.

• Northwest Indian War (1785-1795): Conflict with Native American tribes over control of the Northwest Territory.

• Quasi-War (1798-1800): An undeclared naval war with France.

19th Century:

• War of 1812 (1812-1815): War with Great Britain over maritime rights and territorial disputes.

• First Seminole War (1817-1818): Conflict with Seminole tribes in Florida.

• Mexican-American War (1846-1848): The War with Mexico resulted in the U.S. acquiring vast territories.

• American Civil War (1861-1865): A domestic conflict over slavery and states’ rights.

• Spanish-American War (1898): This War with Spain led to the U.S. acquiring territories like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

20th Century:

• World War I (1917-1918): The U.S. entered the War after initially maintaining neutrality.

• World War II (1941-1945): The U.S. declared War on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

• Korean War (1950-1953): The U.S. led a UN coalition to defend South Korea from North Korean aggression.

• Vietnam War (1955-1975): A long and divisive conflict in Southeast Asia.

• Grenada Invasion (1983): A U.S.-led invasion to overthrow a communist regime.

• Panama Invasion (1989): U.S. forces invaded Panama to remove Manuel Noriega from power.

• Persian Gulf War (1990-1991): The U.S. led a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

21st Century:

• War in Afghanistan (2001-2021): The U.S. led an invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.

• Iraq War (2003-2011): The U.S. invaded Iraq based on claims of weapons of mass destruction.

Other Interventions and Conflicts:

In addition to these major wars, the U.S. has engaged in numerous smaller-scale interventions and conflicts throughout its history, including:

• Indian Wars: The Indian Wars were a series of conflicts between Native American tribes throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.

• Interventions in Central America and the Caribbean: The U.S. has intervened in the affairs of several Latin American countries, often to protect its economic interests or support friendly regimes.

• Covert Operations: The U.S. has conducted numerous covert operations around the world, including regime change efforts and support for armed groups.

This list is not exhaustive. The level of U.S. involvement and the justifications for these conflicts have varied considerably. Historians and scholars often have different interpretations of these events. These conflicts were brutal, and many gave the U.S. taxpayer little to no value. Did U.S. Americans benefit from the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Africa, and Central America or from the many covert operations the U.S. has been involved in? Today, are U.S. Americans more secure, better off, and living in a more stable world than before these military operations? The United States is the most powerful country in the Universe, so it must be able to control things. Politics aside, what do you think?

And let’s remember that Western Civilization has also been party to genocides. If we look at the complex causes behind genocides, all great powers generally have some degree of responsibility for genocides no matter where they occur. Let’s leave that subject off the table for now.

Who Pays For War?

War financing is a complex issue that involves various methods employed by governments. Here’s a breakdown of the primary ways wars are funded:

War Finance Methods and Public Support for War

There are two primary ways countries finance their wars: through borrowing money or by taxing their citizens. Each of these finance options affects the economy differently, and presumably opinions on war will vary based on how the costs of war are reflected in the day-to-day lives of those paying for it. Although numerous studies have examined the way public support for war is influenced by the costs of war—through lives lost and injuries suffered by combatants, military families, and communities—fewer studies have examined the way public support for war is influenced by the way it is financed. In this article, the authors conduct a study to measure if the way countries finance war has a noticeable effect on the public’s support for that war.

Taxation

• Governments can raise taxes to fund military operations directly. This can involve increasing income taxes, sales taxes, or implementing special war taxes.

Using Taxation to Fund Military Spending

World military expenditure is on the rise. To fund their increases in military spending, options available to governments include tax, debt or revenue from natural resources. Each form of financing has its consequences, economic, political or social. 

Tax is the prevalent source of finance for governments. The use of tax, and the choice among different types of tax, can have an impact on income inequality and economic growth, among other things. However, no scholarly attention has yet been paid to the use of taxation to fund military spending. Using statistical analysis combined with in-depth case studies sheds light on this use of taxation. 

The findings—based on data for 100 countries between 1990 and 2020 and reinforced by detailed case studies on Burundi and Ukraine—show that countries in conflict tend to resort to indirect taxation to fund military expenditure. This is particularly true for low-income countries and for countries with an autocratic regime. This association can be consequential, considering the accumulated evidence on the impacts of indirect taxation on income inequality.

Political Trust and Support for a Tax Increase for Social Welfare: The Role of Perceived Tax Burden

Recent decades have seen a rapid increase in social welfare spending in South Korea. Along with rapid population aging and increased demands for social welfare programs, securing a sustainable level of taxation is becoming urgent. Thus, this study explores the factors associated with individuals’ support for a tax increase for social welfare expansion, focusing on political trust. This study also explores the role of perceived tax burden in moderating the linkage between political trust and individuals’ support for a tax increase for social welfare expansion. Using ordered probit and the 2019 National Survey of Tax and Benefit, this study found that political trust is positively associated with support for a tax increase for social welfare expansion. However, the positive effect of political trust decreases when individuals perceive their tax burdens as high. This study offers implications of the findings for policymakers such as simplifying tax codes and improving tax fairness for taxpayers.

• Taxation has the advantage of directly linking the cost of War to the public, potentially influencing public opinion and support for the conflict. However, raising taxes can be unpopular and may face political resistance.

The Motives to Borrow

Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax-smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing though budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating governments’ tendencies to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low output growth, it is likely that some countries pay a price—in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility—for excessive debt accumulation.

Borrowing

• Governments often borrow money to finance wars by issuing bonds or other debt instruments. Individuals, institutions, or even foreign governments purchase these bonds.

What is the national debt?

Simply put, the national debt is similar to a person using a credit card for purchases and not paying off the full balance each month. The cost of purchases exceeding the amount paid off represents a deficit, while accumulated deficits over time represents a person’s overall debt.

• Borrowing allows governments to fund wars without immediately impacting taxpayers, but it creates a long-term financial burden as the debt must be repaid with interest. This can lead to increased national debt and potential economic consequences in the future.

Economic Costs

Through Fiscal Year 2022, the United States federal government has spent and obligated $8 trillion dollars on the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and elsewhere. This figure includes: direct Congressional war appropriations; war-related increases to the Pentagon base budget; veterans care and disability; increases in the homeland security budget; interest payments on direct war borrowing; foreign assistance spending; and estimated future obligations for veterans’ care.

This total omits many other expenses, such as the macroeconomic costs to the US economy; the opportunity costs of not investing war dollars in alternative sectors; future interest on war borrowing; and local government and private war costs.

How is money created?

Cash, which includes banknotes and coins in circulation, together with bank reserves (i.e. commercial banks’ deposits with the central bank), make up the monetary base. This monetary base can only be expanded by central banks – in the case of the euro area, the European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks –, either by printing banknotes and minting coins, or by creating bank reserves, which are an electronic form of money.

Central banks’ balance sheets are divided into assets and liabilities (see the ECB’s annual consolidated balance sheet). When it creates money, the Eurosystem increases the liability side of its balance sheet, which is balanced by an equal increase on the asset side. The Eurosystem may expand its balance sheet in response to a greater liquidity demand by commercial banks or to the ECB’s explicit desire to increase its balance sheet by a predetermined amount. In the latter case, the ECB can purchase financial assets, such as government or corporate bonds. It can also provide financing to banks through open market operations or the marginal lending facility. The financial assets obtained by the ECB will be recorded in the asset side of its balance sheet.

The ECB does not actually print new banknotes to purchase these assets, but rather creates money electronically in the form of bank reserves. For example, in refinancing operations with commercial banks, the central bank credits the amount granted to the participating banks directly into their current account with the central bank. Financial asset purchases also cause reserves to rise, either because the seller is a commercial bank or an agent that has a current account with a commercial bank. In the latter case, the central bank credits the amount of the sale to the commercial bank so that it can, in turn, pay the seller.

Money Creation (Printing Money)

• Central banks can create new money to finance government spending, including war efforts. This is often called “printing money” or “monetizing debt.”

• Creating new money can lead to inflation, which can erode the value of savings and have other adverse economic effects. However, it can be a quick way to finance immediate war needs.

How Does Money Supply Affect Inflation?

When the Federal Reserve increases the money supply, inflation may occur. More often than not, if the Fed is attempting to stimulate the economy by growing the money supply, prices will increase, the cost of goods will be unstable, and inflation will likely occur.

Combination of Methods

• In practice, governments often use a combination of these methods to finance wars. The specific mix depends on various factors, including the scale of the conflict, the country’s economic situation, and political considerations.

Who Pays for War?

Ultimately, the cost of War is borne by society, both during and after the conflict.

How High is the Cost of War Around the World in 2019?

Violence disrupts the economy, resulting in adverse and ongoing negative effects even after conflict subsides.

• Taxpayers directly pay for the War through taxes, even if borrowing is used, as the debt will eventually need to be repaid through future taxes.

• Citizens suffer the economic consequences of War, including inflation, job losses, and reduced investment in other areas like education and healthcare.

• Future Generations inherit the financial burden of war debt and may face long-term economic challenges due to the conflict’s impact.

Central Bank’s Role

Central banks play a crucial role in managing the financial aspects of War. They may:

• Facilitate government borrowing by purchasing bonds.

• Control inflation by adjusting interest rates and money supply.

• Act as a lender of last resort to stabilize the financial system during times of crisis.

Central Banking in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine

In times of conflict, central banks play a pivotal role in ensuring the stability of the financial system. The experience of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) during the ongoing war with Russia offers insights into how central banks can navigate and manage economic crises during periods of hostility.

Important Considerations

• The economic impact of War can be significant and long-lasting, even for countries not directly involved in the fighting.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could upend fiscal and monetary policy in advanced economies

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an unmitigated catastrophe for global peace and particularly for peace in Europe. But the war also greatly compounds a number of preexisting adverse global economic trends, including rising inflation, extreme poverty, increasing food insecurity, deglobalization, and worsening environmental degradation. In addition, with an apparent end to the peace dividend that has long helped finance higher social expenditures, rebalancing fiscal priorities could prove quite challenging even in advanced economies. 

• The human cost of War, including loss of life, displacement, and trauma, is immeasurable.

• Understanding the financial mechanisms of War is crucial for analyzing its economic and social consequences.

Direct Economic Costs

Stocks and Flows

Calculating the Cost of Raw Materials: A Crucial Step in Understanding the Economic Burden of War

The Significance of Manufacturing Costs: A Major Contributor to the Economic Burden of War

• Machines of War: The cost of producing or acquiring military vehicles, aircraft, ships, drones, and other equipment.

• Uniforms and personal gear: The cost of providing soldiers with clothing, protective gear, and other necessary equipment. Who pays? Who makes (China)?

• Training and recruitment: The cost of recruiting, training, and equipping military personnel is always necessary and substantial.

• Salaries and benefits: The ongoing cost of paying soldiers and providing them with healthcare, housing, and other benefits is ongoing.

The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an unmitigated catastrophe for global peace and particularly for peace in Europe. But the war also greatly compounds several preexisting adverse global economic trends, including rising inflation, extreme poverty, increasing food insecurity, deglobalization, and worsening environmental degradation. In addition, with an apparent end to the peace dividend that has long helped finance higher social expenditures, rebalancing fiscal priorities could prove quite challenging even in advanced economies. 

• Energy inputs: The fuel cost (jet fuel, gasoline, diesel, coking coal) and other energy sources used for transportation, operations, and maintaining military bases. Where is this energy obtained, and how?

Indirect Economic Costs

• Loss of materials and infrastructure: The destruction of physical assets like factories, roads, bridges, and buildings due to military operations.

• Disruption of economic activity: The impact of War on trade, production, and investment, leading to economic decline and job losses.

People may hate Russians, but it’s Ukrainian territory and people who are suffering the brunt of this War. How many Ukrainians must die to kill “X” number of Russians, and under various circumstances, how long can the War be sustained? What will “The West” achieve if they “win” the War? These are not simple questions. Who pays the price?

Cost-benefit analysis of war

Purpose Among the many perspectives to analyze war, such as rational actors, organizational processes, governmental politics, and ethics, the perspective that incorporates costs and benefits into a systematic theoretical structure has hardly been analyzed. This paper aims to analyze the perspective of costs and benefits. Design/methodology/approach Three kinds of value are distinguished, i.e., human, economic, and influence—different actors (politicians, populations, stakeholders, etc). Assign different weights to the three kinds of values. Six gradually more complicated models are developed. The first subtracts losses from gains for the three types of value. Thereafter, the paper accounts for multiple periods, time discounting, attitude towards risk, multiple stakeholders, subcategories for the three kinds of value, sequential decision-making, and game theory. Findings The rich theoretical structure enables assessing costs and benefits more systematically and illuminatingly. The cost-benefit analysis is illustrated in the 2003-2011 Iraq War. The paper estimates the gained and lost value of human lives, economic value, and influence value, and shows how different weights impact the decision of whether to initiate war differently. Originality/value The paper provides scientists and policymakers with a theoretical structure to evaluate the costs and benefits of war, accounting for how different actors estimate weights, the future, risk, and various parameter values differently.

• Diversion of resources: The reallocation of resources from productive sectors of the economy to military spending, potentially hindering long-term growth.

• Financing costs: The cost of borrowing money to fund military operations, including interest payments and the burden on future generations.

• Rebuilding costs: The massive expenses associated with reconstructing war-torn nations, including infrastructure, housing, and public services.

Social Costs

War and international trade: Impact of trade disruption on international trade patterns and economic development

The disruptions of trade flows due to military conflicts leads to changes in economic structures of countries, to the subsequent changes in trade policies, and to the changes of established trade patterns with impact on position of countries in international trade system. This paper deals with three modern time’s conflicts: Napoleonic Wars, WWI and WWII. We argue that the changes resulting from the disruption of trade flows itself, leads to changes and shifts which are relatively permanent, independent on outcomes of the conflicts for individual countries, and do significantly affect regions which did not take part in the conflict.

•   Civilian deaths and injuries: The tragic loss of human lives and the long-term impact on families and communities.

•   Psychological trauma: The widespread mental health issues among soldiers and civilians, including PTSD, depression, and anxiety.

The Civilian Consequences of Conflict

In 1861, journalists, politicians, and their families set up picnics to watch the first land battle of the American Civil War. The onlookers expected the fighting to be quick, relatively bloodless, and—perhaps most importantly—safe to observe.

Those assumptions were inaccurate; the ensuing fighting sent soldiers and spectators scrambling.

But those assumptions were also not entirely unfounded. Many wars at the time were confined to the battlefield, and soldiers—not civilians—would end up composing most of the Civil War’s casualties.

However, wars in recent decades have become increasingly deadly for civilians. Civilian casualties outnumbered battlefield deaths during World War II, as combatants bombed major cities. Between 1990 and 2000, civilians accounted for 90 percent [PDF] of the world’s four million war-related deaths.

This resource explores the various threats facing civilians in today’s conflicts and their devastating consequences, which linger long after the final bomb has fallen.

• Displacement and refugees: The forced migration of people due to conflict, leading to social disruption and humanitarian crises.

The Effects of Trauma on Military Members and Their Families

Members of the armed forces can face stressors and traumatic events. These experiences can lead to trauma-related mental health disorders. Trauma can impact military members in different ways, including feelings of anger or isolation from family and friends.

Service members can develop PTSD or other trauma-related disorders, as well as depression, anxiety, panic, and grief. Family members may also have trauma responses when loved ones are deployed, or as the loved one readjusts to post-deployment life or experiences mental health challenges.

It is important to remember that resources are available to help all involved.

• Social instability: The potential for increased crime, violence, and social unrest in the aftermath of War.

The Economics of Conflict: A Costly Reality

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reported that, by the end of 2020, there were 82.4 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, including refugees and internally displaced persons. The economic burden of managing these displaced populations is immense, impacting both host countries and the international community

Consequences of Exposure to War Violence: Discriminating Those with Heightened Risk for Aggression from Those with Heightened Risk for Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms

Chronic exposure to ethnic–political and war violence has deleterious effects throughout childhood. Some youths exposed to war violence are more likely to act aggressively afterwards, and some are more likely to experience post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTS symptoms). However, the concordance of these two outcomes is not strong, and it is unclear what discriminates between those who are at more risk for one or the other. Drawing on prior research on desensitization and arousal and on recent social–cognitive theorizing about how high anxious arousal to violence can inhibit aggression, we hypothesized that those who characteristically experience higher anxious arousal when exposed to violence should display a lower increase in aggression after exposure to war violence but the same or a higher increase in PTS symptoms compared to those low in anxious arousal. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed data from our 4-wave longitudinal interview study of 1051 Israeli and Palestinian youths (ages at Wave 1 ranged from 8 to 14, and at Wave 4 from 15–22). We used the 4 waves of data on aggression, PTS symptoms, and exposure to war violence, along with additional data collected during Wave 4 on the anxious arousal participants experienced while watching a very violent film unrelated to war violence (N = 337). Longitudinal analyses revealed that exposure to war violence significantly increased both the risk of subsequent aggression and PTS symptoms. However, anxious arousal in response to seeing the unrelated violent film (measured from skin conductance and self-reports of anxiety) moderated the relation between exposure to war violence and subsequent psychological and behavioral outcomes. Those who experienced greater anxious arousal while watching the violent film showed a weaker positive relation between amount of exposure to war violence and aggression toward their peers but a stronger positive relation between amount of exposure to war violence and PTS symptoms.

Environmental Costs

• Ecocide: The intentional or unintentional destruction of ecosystems due to military activities, including the use of chemical weapons and the disruption of natural habitats.

The effects of modern war and military activities on biodiversity and the environment

War is an ever-present force that has the potential to alter the biosphere. Here, we review the potential consequences of modern war and military activities on ecosystem structure and function. We focus on the effects of direct conflict, nuclear weapons, military training, and military-produced contaminants. Overall, the aforementioned activities were found to have overwhelmingly negative effects on ecosystem structure and function. Dramatic habitat alteration, environmental pollution, and disturbance contributed to population declines and biodiversity losses arising from both acute and chronic effects in both terrestrial and aquatic systems. In some instances, even in the face of massive alterations to ecosystem structure, recovery was possible. Interestingly, military activity was beneficial under specific conditions, such as when an exclusion zone was generated that generally resulted in population increases and (or) population recovery; an observation noted in both terrestrial and aquatic systems. Additionally, military technological advances (e.g., GPS technology, drone technology, biotelemetry) have provided conservation scientists with novel tools for research. Because of the challenges associated with conducting research in areas with military activities (e.g., restricted access, hazardous conditions), information pertaining to military impacts on the environment are relatively scarce and are often studied years after military activities have ceased and with no knowledge of baseline conditions. Additional research would help to elucidate the environmental consequences (positive and negative) and thus reveal opportunities for mitigating negative effects while informing the development of optimal strategies for rehabilitation and recovery.

• Pollution: The release of harmful substances into the air, water, and soil due to explosions, fires, and the use of military equipment.

The Environmental Costs of Armed Conflicts

The costs of armed conflicts are not only high for humanity, but also for the environment. Undoubtedly armed conflicts cause losses of lives and human suffering that continues well beyond the end of armed hostilities. However, armed conflicts also come with a high price for the environment. Militaries around the world continue to be one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, and armed conflicts continue to directly damage nature and biodiversity and leave behind hazardous waste and pollutants. Moreover, it is important to remember that environmental suffering directly contributes to human suffering. In addition, the indirect environmental costs of conflicts are immense, as rebuilding and restoring infrastructure and nature after armed conflicts often directs important resources away from addressing the existing climate crisis and other environmental issues. Therefore, for Supreme Audit Institutions, the environmental costs of armed conflicts bring a significant challenge to traditional environmental auditing.

• Resource depletion: The overuse of natural resources to support military operations, potentially leading to long-term environmental damage.

Opportunity Costs

• Lost investments in social programs: Funds diverted from education, healthcare, and other social programs to military spending can potentially hinder human development and well-being.

Military spending

There are many direct and indirect links between military expenditure, the arms trade, violent conflict, and the reduction of available resources for social and economic development. Governments that spend excessive financial, technological, and human resources on their militaries divert resources from economic, social, and environmental programmes. The military-industrial complex—composed of a state’s armed forces, the government, suppliers of weapons systems and services (corporations), and academic institutions that conduct research on weapon systems and designs—absorbs vast amounts of funding that could otherwise be spent on human security, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, funds reserved for development initiatives are increasingly spent on emergency relief and rehabilitation operations to clean up after violent conflict.

• Foregone economic growth: The potential for lost economic output and innovation due to the focus on military activities instead of productive investments.

War Diminishes Global Economic Growth

War is expensive and destructive, affecting long-term economic growth of a country through population changes, fewer investments, and worsened educational outcomes. What is the global economic burden of violent conflict when considering the total impact of all wars? Olaf J. de Groot, Carlos Bozzoli, Anousheh Alamir, and Tilman Brück estimate the average economic impact of violent conflicts by comparing the observed (with conflict) and hypothetical (without conflict) gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in 190 countries from 1970 to 2014. Their analysis also measures the economic effect of three types of violent conflict (civil, interstate, and non-territorial), conflict intensity, and how violent conflict affects neighboring countries.

Timeframe for Recovery

• Return to “normal”: The time it takes for a country to recover from War varies greatly depending on the scale of the conflict, the extent of the damage, and the availability of reconstruction resources. A nation can rebuild its economy, infrastructure, and social fabric in years or even decades.

Other Considerations

• Loss of human capital: The death or injury of skilled workers and professionals, leading to a loss of productivity and economic potential.

• Political instability: The potential for War to destabilize governments and lead to further conflict or social unrest.

• Geopolitical implications: The impact of War on international relations and the global balance of power.

The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War

For the global economy, fuel and food shortages caused by the war are exacerbating post-pandemic inflation that had already reached multi-decade highs in most of the world. To say that the causes are well known would be an exaggeration given that the ultralow inflation of the 2010s still puzzles academic macroeconomists. But the main drivers are apparent. First, governments and central banks were slow to unwind unprecedented peacetime macroeconomic stimulus. Certainly, record early stimulus greatly helped cushion the first stage of the pandemic, but in some cases, it persisted too long and proved excessive after the unexpectedly sharp rebound in advanced economies and some emerging markets. In the United States, in particular, the combination of a $900 billion fiscal stimulus at the end of 2020 followed by a $1.7 trillion package in March 2021 proved too much, too late.

Supply chain disruptions have also been a major contributing factor to inflation, although some of the strain on supply should really be traced to the sudden surge in demand. Across advanced economies, more than half (including the United States and the euro area) had inflation rates of over 5 percent even before hostilities, so that the war made an already difficult situation worse. Prior to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine combined accounted for a quarter of global wheat exports, and Russia is a major supplier of fossil fuels, especially to Europe. Disruptions to supplies of these commodities are driving up prices.

Territorial disputes and conflicting claims to land are motivated by resource competition, ethnic/nationalist tensions fueled by identity or expansionist desires, political/ideological differences over governance and influence, economic factors, trade routes and resources, and historical grievances.

The Ukraine-Russia War is complex and involves all these motivations to certain degrees, but it was not inevitable; it could have been prevented.

The War in Ukraine, for example, is another war created by the U.S. “Empire.” To understand this, you must read about the events leading up to the Maidan revolution and the part U.S. covert operations played. Most people don’t care to learn about such things. People absorb the propaganda narratives and reflexively see the world as good and evil, good guys against bad guys. In the 21st Century, this way of understanding the world is childish and more destructive than ever.

We need to grow up and become peacemakers and peace defenders. This is the only way anyone will know security and the only way our species can have a future.

People who revel in the death toll of one side or the other are sociopathic, deluded, and ignorant.

Estimating War Dead—back of the envelope data-points

The United States is not a friend of any country. The United States has “interests,” not principles. The United States plays by rules that it can break whenever it wants to. The United States does not adhere to international law. A cursory understanding of U.S. conflicts throughout history tells you that the U.S. always throws its allies under the bus.

Understanding the United States’ relentless focus on undermining China’s power is crucial to contextualizing the Russia-Ukraine war. China’s role in the U.S. geopolitical strategy is central, and this knowledge is key to understanding the broader context of the conflict. U.S. strategic interests have been known for decades.

The crucial question is, how many Ukrainian soldiers have to die to kill “X” number of Russian soldiers? It’s a war of attrition where Ukrainians and Russians are dying. How much Ukrainian territory has to be demolished before the War ends? Are Europeans in the E.U. willing to die in Ukraine to sustain the War effort against Russia? Europe doesn’t have the industrial capacity to provide Ukraine with all the materials it needs to win. How many Ukrainians will die before it does? Has the U.S. and the U.K. achieved any of its objectives so far? Will they ever? What are they? Why did they ignore peace offerings before and directly after the invasion? Does the Anglosphere think it’s winning? What are Ukrainian fighters winning? What will The West do if Ukraine loses? Am I dumb to be concerned about that? “They can’t lose, Steven. Our side is super tough, strong, and rich and powerful with Wunderwaffe.” The invasion was illegal and wrong, but since when did the United States care about international law? The Rules-Based Order is not a legal system.

Propaganda outlets can throw out a number representing the number of Russians that have died to date in the Russian-Ukraine war, but is it accurate? What was the cost of achieving whatever the precise number is? What utility is a number in The Economist magazine other than propaganda?

Estimating the losses of Ukrainian soldiers in the War with Russia is a complex task. The fog of War, conflicting information, and deliberate misinformation make propaganda unreliable. Therefore, a data-driven approach is not just necessary but imperative. Identifying responsible and unbiased organizations using this approach to estimate casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war is crucial. However, we won’t know the total casualties until years after the War ends. For now, the War rages on, so a number today will be outdated tomorrow. Why get so excited about it?

I. Demographics and Manpower

Pre-war population demographics:

For a baseline, we need to know the age and gender breakdown of Ukraine’s Population, particularly men of fighting age (18-60).

While precise figures are difficult to obtain due to the ongoing War and displacement, here's an approximation of the age and gender breakdown of Ukraine's Population, with a focus on men of fighting age (18-60):

Overall Population:

• Estimated Population (2025): Approximately 38-40 million (sources vary due to the War's impact on demographics)

• Gender Ratio: Slightly more women than men overall

Age Breakdown (Approximate):

• 0-14 years: 15-20%

• 15-64 years: 65-70% (This includes men of fighting age)

• 65+ years: 15-20%

Men of Fighting Age (18-60):

• Estimated Number: 8-10 million (this is a rough estimate, as the exact number is complex to determine due to displacement and wartime conditions)

• Factors Affecting the Number:

  • Pre-war Population: Ukraine had a declining population and an aging demographic profile before the War.

  • Wartime losses: Military casualties and civilian deaths have reduced the number of men in this age group.

  • Displacement: Millions of Ukrainians, mostly women and children, have fled the country, while many men of fighting age have likely stayed.

  • Mobilization: The number of men who have joined the armed forces or territorial defense units is a significant factor, but precise figures are not readily available.

Challenges and Limitations:

• Data Accuracy: Wartime conditions make it difficult to collect accurate demographic data.

• Population Movement: The large-scale displacement of people makes it challenging to track population changes.

• Changing Demographics: The War has likely accelerated some demographic trends, such as declining birth rates and an aging population.

Sources:

• Worldometer: Provides estimates of Ukraine's Population and age distribution.

• United Nations: Offers demographic data and reports on Ukraine.

• State Statistics Service of Ukraine: Official source for demographic information, though data may be limited due to the War.

Additional Notes:

• The figures provided here are approximations, and the actual numbers will vary.

• The War has significantly impacted Ukraine's demographics, and the long-term effects are yet to be seen.

Behind these numbers are individual lives and families affected by the War.

Mobilization and conscription:

What are the official figures for the number of men mobilized or conscripted into the Ukrainian armed forces, including initial waves and subsequent mobilization rounds?

Precise and publicly released figures for the total number of men mobilized or conscripted into the Ukrainian armed forces are not readily available. During wartime, this information is often considered sensitive for national security reasons. Governments rarely disclose the full extent of their mobilization efforts, as it could provide valuable intelligence to the enemy.

While exact numbers are elusive, we can glean some information from various sources:

• General statements: Ukrainian officials, including President Zelenskyy, have frequently discussed the need for mobilization and acknowledged multiple rounds of mobilization. They have emphasized the importance of replenishing losses and expanding the armed forces but have not given specific numbers.

• Legislative acts: Ukraine has passed laws related to mobilization, defining the categories of individuals eligible for conscription and outlining the procedures. These legal documents provide a framework but don't state the number of individuals targeted for mobilization.

• Anecdotal evidence and media reports: News reports and personal accounts from Ukraine indicate that mobilization has been a significant undertaking involving individuals from various backgrounds and age groups. However, these sources don't comprehensively depict the total number mobilized.

• Expert analysis: Some military analysts and think tanks have attempted to estimate the size of the Ukrainian armed forces, taking into account pre-war numbers, mobilization efforts, and reported losses. These estimates vary, and they often rely on indirect evidence and assumptions.

Why the secrecy?

The lack of official figures is understandable, given the context of the War. Disclosing the precise number of mobilized troops could reveal:

• Strength of reserves: How many potential recruits remain available?

• Manpower limitations: Any potential shortages or challenges in recruitment.

• Mobilization effectiveness: The success or failure of recruitment strategies.

The enemy could exploit all of this information.

Where to look for potential updates:

It's possible that more information about mobilization numbers may be released after the War concludes, once the information is no longer strategically sensitive. Researchers and historians may eventually gain access to archival data that sheds more light on this topic. However, for the duration of the conflict, it's unlikely that precise figures will be made public.

Volunteer soldiers:

How many Ukrainians voluntarily joined the armed forces, including those who joined territorial defense units or foreign legions? How long is their contract?

How many foreign fighters has Ukraine recruited, and what is their estimated compensation package? For example, we know that Ukraine has recruited mercenaries from Columbia.

Draft evasion and emigration

How many men fled the country to avoid conscription, legally emigrated, or sought refuge elsewhere?

Recruitment age

What is the current recruitment age in Ukraine, what are any proposed changes (like lowering it to 18), and what is the potential impact on available manpower?

It is well known that Ukraine has a manpower problem in its armed forces, not to mention the stresses the War has brought to bear on its workforce in general.

Military reserve

What was the size and composition of Ukraine’s military reserve before the War, and how many reservists were activated? What is the size and composition of Ukraine’s military reserve now?

II. Military Deployment and Combat

Front line length

We need an accurate and up-to-date estimation of the front lines of conflict in different regions of Ukraine to understand troop density on the front lines.

Obtaining a truly accurate and up-to-the-minute estimation of the front lines in Ukraine is very difficult. Here's why:

• Fluid situation: The front lines are constantly shifting due to ongoing combat. Any information can quickly become outdated.

• Information warfare: Both sides may exaggerate gains or minimize losses, making it hard to verify claims.

• Limited access: Independent observers have limited access to the front lines, making it hard to confirm information.

However, here are some resources that can provide a reasonable approximation of the front lines:

• Live maps: Several organizations and news outlets provide interactive maps that are updated regularly based on available information. Some reliable options include:

  • Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine

  • ACLED: https://acleddata.com/

  • ISW: https://www.understandingwar.org/

  • Liveuamap: https://liveuamap.com/

• Official statements: Ukrainian and Russian military officials provide updates on the situation, though these should be treated with caution due to potential biases.

• Independent media: Reputable news organizations with correspondents on the ground can provide valuable insights, but their access may be limited.

• Satellite imagery: Analysis of satellite images can provide evidence of troop movements and changes in control of territory.

Important considerations:

• Accuracy: Even the best maps are approximations, and some level of uncertainty is inevitable.

• Timeliness: The situation can change rapidly, so it's essential to rely on the most up-to-date information available.

• Verification: Cross-reference information from multiple sources to get a more complete picture and identify any discrepancies.

Estimating troop density:

Once you have a general understanding of the front lines, you can start to estimate troop density. This involves considering:

• Front line length: The total length of the front line in different regions.

• Terrain: Some terrain is easier to defend than others, requiring fewer troops.

• Enemy strength: The size and capabilities of the opposing force will influence troop deployment.

• Strategic importance: Areas of strategic importance will likely have higher troop density.

By combining information on the front lines with these factors, you can develop a rough estimate of troop density in different areas. However, keep in mind that this will be an approximation, as precise figures are difficult to obtain.

Remember that the situation in Ukraine is dynamic, and any information you gather should be considered in the context of the evolving conflict

Rotation and rest

How often and for how long are Ukrainian units rotated out of combat for rest and replenishment? What effect does this have on the number of soldiers exposed to combat?

Combat intensity

What has been the frequency and scale of battles, artillery exchanges, and other combat actions at various locations throughout the War, and what’s happening now? Higher intensity leads to higher casualties.

Types of Combat

What proportion of casualties results from different types of warfare (trench warfare, urban combat, missile strikes, etc.)? This information can inform casualty estimates based on historical data.

III. Casualties and Losses

Official casualty figures

While potentially underreported, official Ukrainian military casualty figures provide a starting point but are entirely inadequate for providing accurate numbers due to biases and propaganda purposes.

Hospital data

If possible, access to military hospital records would provide data on wounded soldiers and the severity of their injuries.

Funeral home and cemetery data

Information on the number of military burials might be incomplete due to ongoing conflict and logistical challenges.

Prisoner of war exchanges

Data on the number of Ukrainian soldiers captured, and the number returned through prisoner exchanges is crucial to understanding Ukraine’s potential to sustain a defensive war.

Missing in action

What is the number of Ukrainian soldiers listed as missing in action? MIA may eventually be confirmed dead.

Foreign fighter losses

What is the number of foreign volunteers killed or wounded while fighting for Ukraine? Where could we find data on this?

IV. Other Factors

Russian force size and composition

What are the size and capabilities of the Russian forces facing Ukraine, including their manpower advantage (if any)?

Weaponry and technology

What weapons are used by both sides, as some cause more casualties than others? Drones are a massive factor in this War. It is well known that China is selling drone components to both sides.

Medical care

What quality of medical care is available to Ukrainian soldiers, as better care can reduce fatalities among the wounded?

Terrain and environment

How does the terrain (urban vs. rural, open vs. forested) affect combat and casualty rates?

V. Challenges and Limitations

Data access

Obtaining reliable data from a war zone is extremely difficult.

Information warfare

Both sides engage in information warfare, making it hard to verify claims.

Estimating vs. counting

Even with all the data points, some level of estimation will be necessary, as it’s impossible to know the exact number of casualties in real-time.

Additional Considerations

Independent verification

Independent verification is crucial. Seek data from multiple sources, including international organizations, independent media, and think tanks, to cross-reference information and reduce bias. This approach will provide a more comprehensive and reliable picture of the situation.

Time factor

Casualty figures are not static. They constantly change, reflecting the fluid nature of the conflict. Any estimate is a snapshot in time, so staying updated with the latest information is essential.

How long can Ukraine sustain the War without E.U. combatants? If the U.K. sends troops to fight on the front lines, will this increase the risk of nuclear War?

Ethical considerations

It's crucial to remember that behind every number are human lives lost. The focus should always be on the war's human cost and our analysis's ethical implications.

Gathering and analyzing as much of this data as possible while acknowledging the limitations can help us develop a more informed and evidence-based estimate of Ukrainian soldier losses in the war.

Some additional factors that could improve the accuracy of the estimate:

• Casualty ratios: Historical data on the ratio of killed to wounded soldiers in similar conflicts. This can help estimate the number of wounded based on the fatalities.

• Disease and non-combat deaths: Number of soldiers who died from disease, accidents, or other non-combat causes.

• Desertion rates: Number of Ukrainian soldiers who deserted their posts.

• Mercenary and foreign fighter losses: Number of mercenaries or foreign volunteers killed or wounded while fighting for Ukraine.

• Civilian casualties: While not soldiers, civilian deaths can impact morale and the overall war effort, and some civilians may be involved in fighting or supporting the war effort.

• Long-term health impacts: Data on the long-term health consequences of injuries sustained in the War, such as disability and mental health issues. This can provide a more complete picture of the War's impact on Ukrainian soldiers.

• Psychological impact: Data on the mental health toll of War on soldiers, including PTSD, depression, and anxiety, is an essential but often overlooked aspect of war losses.

It's important to remember that even with all these data points, any estimate of Ukrainian soldier losses will have some degree of uncertainty. However, by considering a wide range of factors and using multiple sources of information, it's possible to arrive at a more informed and accurate estimate.

This is nowhere near a comprehensive list of the data points needed for an accurate number.

Ultimately, the outcome of a war depends on many factors, including the size and strength of the forces involved, the quality of their leadership, the technology they have available, evolving tactics, and the overall strategic situation. Note the new tactics employed by each side in the War.

The defender generally has a significant advantage, especially in a war with a long line of defense. Defenders have time to prepare their positions, fortify them, and create obstacles. Defenders are familiar with the terrain, which allows them to use it to their advantage. They know the best places to position their forces, where to set ambushes, and how to use natural obstacles to slow down or stop the enemy. Defenders have shorter supply lines, making getting the resources they need easier. Has Ukraine thus far defended its territory effectively? Look at the maps.

***But this is not Vietnam between 1955 and 1975.

Russia may have an advantage here because this is a border war; Russia is a vast country with a larger population, more materials, energy sources, and industrial capacity. NATO countries have provided weapons, training, and money but are not actively engaged in fighting Russia. NATO presently has limited industrial capacity. It remains to be seen if spending energy and materials for Ukraine will remain popular in various European countries. Defenders often fight to protect their homes and families, making them more determined and resilient. Attackers may not have the same level of motivation, especially if they are fighting far from home. The Russia-Ukraine war is a border war where both sides believe they are fighting in defense of their homeland—both sides are highly motivated to fight.

***Does it appear that the sanctions against Russia are working?

Western countries imposed extensive sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the measures were unilateral and piecemeal – and while they have been effective in disrupting the Russian economy, evasion and ‘trade deflection’ through third countries limits their impact.

Theory to Reality: Defensive Operations Confirm Clausewitz’s Theory

Since its publication in 1832, Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege (On War) has been an academic pillar for Western military strategists, influencing military doctrine and shaping the debate on power relationships. Clausewitz, a Prussian military officer, fought against the French during the Napoleonic Wars and participated in the Waterloo campaign, which culminated in the surrender of Napoleon Bonaparte. His firsthand experience in these battles provided him with valuable insights into the nature and character of War. In addition to his combat experience, Clausewitz spent considerable time in staff roles within the Prussian Army, affording him the intellectual space to examine the complexities of conflict.[i] This unique blend of theoretical investigation and battlefield experience lends authenticity to “On War,” solidifying its high status in the intellectual study of military theory and making it a seminal text that continues to be studied and debated.

Central to Clausewitz’s theory is the argument that defensive operations hold an inherent advantage over offensive operations[ii]— a proclamation this article argues resonates in contemporary armed conflicts. The aim is to confirm the credibility of Clausewitz’s assertion by examining its relevance through four core tenets of warfare that undergird his philosophy: resource supply, psychological influence, public support, and fortifications. This article first discusses Clausewitzian theory in relation to defensive operations, a brief history of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and then considers the strategic implications of the culminating point of the attack. The bulk of this article’s analysis defines each tenet according to Clausewitz’s writings, then describes how these four tenets provide defensive advantages to both Ukrainians and Russians amid the ongoing conflict. [iii] The aim of this article is to affirm Clausewitz’s assertion that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” [iv]

There are also some disadvantages to being on the defensive. Defenders must spread their forces thinly to cover a long line, which can make them vulnerable to breakthroughs. They may also have to fight on multiple fronts, which can stretch their resources. How fast are Ukrainian forces being diminished? Ukraine has a manpower problem.

History can give us examples from which to extrapolate, but an accurate body count will only be achieved years after the War ends. The ruth is, we don’t know what will happen this year.

The cost of this War is too high. It didn’t have to happen; I could include pages of references on this fact alone.

Additional Resources

Over and over, U.S. government officials and their mainstream media allies called Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine an “unprovoked attack.” The slogan became so overused that people began to ask the obvious question: Why do they protest so much?

In Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine, Scott Horton explains how since the end of the last Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, successive U.S. administrations pressed their advantage against the new Russian Federation to the point that it finally blew up into a full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine.

From NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, to “shock therapy” economic policy, the Balkan and Chechen wars, color-coded revolutions, new missile defense systems, assassinations, Russiagate and ultimately the brutal conflict in Ukraine, Provoked shows what really happened and why it did not have to be this way.

Prisoners of War: What you need to know

UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine

Columbia Journal of International Affairs

The Kyiv Independent

Mediazona

Center For Strategic and International Studies

The Application of Remote Sensing for Detecting Mass Graves: An Experimental Animal Case Study from Costa Rica

Military blogs and forums

Wilson Center

Public Policy Research Think Tanks: Top Think Tanks - Worldwide (US and non-US)

51 Peacebuilding Think Tanks and Peace Research Groups

International Institute For Strategic Studies

A List of useful Australian and International links.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Chatham House

Counsel on Foreign Relations

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Center for a New American Security

Brookings

Big Think

70 Best Military Blogs and Websites in 2025

***Be cautious about all media outlets, as they are all biased to a certain degree. When you see the exact copy across multiple mainstream news outlets, consider it might be propaganda and not always verifiable, factual information.

***The above is not a comprehensive list of resources.

Analysis and challenges

• Compare and cross-reference information from different sources to identify patterns and discrepancies.

• Consider the potential biases and limitations of each source.

• Acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in estimating casualties in an active war zone.

• Corroborate anecdotal information.

• Consider the objectives of your source.

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America Was Always Ukraine's Worst Enemy

As Ukraine goes from meat grinder to the sausage, America is cutting them up and devouring them for rare earth. Call it Kissinger's curse. In 1968, Heinz Kissinger said, ‘It's dangerous to be America's enemy, but fatal to be America's friend.’ Kissinger said this as a counterfactual, if not X then Y, but five decades and as many ex-states later, the facts are in. To be America's friend is fatal. Ask South Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Ukraine, the new kid on the chopping block. What's meat to a butcher, in the end? Just another way to make money.

America is in the war business and everything else is just marketing. All the Human Rights© and Democracy™ is a distraction, like a pretty girl on a car ad. As capitalist imam Milton Friedman said (to Joel Bakan),

A corporation is the property of its stockholders. Its interests are the interests of its stockholders. Now, beyond that should it spend the stockholders’ money for purposes which it regards as socially responsible but which it cannot connect to its bottom line? The answer I would say is no.

America is not merely run like a business, it is a business, owned by shady shareholders called the donor class. Understanding that America is a business, you can understand that all the talk of values is empty marketing. As Friedman said, that the only role social responsibility in business is advertising, like “putting a good-looking girl in front of an automobile to sell an automobile. That’s not in order to promote pulchritude. That’s in order to sell cars.” Or in this case, tanks. America is a protection racket and a notorious pump-and-dumper and Europe and Ukraine are just their latest marks.

To understand America just follow the money. America Inc's business model is very simple. Corrupt and/or coup a country, throw them into war with their neighbors, profit from the munitions. They keep pumping the the blood pump till its empty, then they dump the country and move on. America long ago figured out that there's more money in losing wars than winning them. The business model is as the late C. Wallace described in 1997, “Wreck it, buy a new one.”

Biggie's full verse is,

I can fill you with real millionaire shit (I can fill ya)
Escargot, my car go one-sixty, swiftly (Come on)
Wreck it, buy a new one
Your crew run-run-run, your crew run-run

The Notorious BIG, like many rappers, channeled the id of American ideology in his verses. Run and gun, smash and grab. You can replace libraries of hand-wringing political science with Biggie's song Gimme The Loot. Loot is a word literally looted from India, and the descendants of slaves sing the unconscious American id. As Biggie said, “I've been robbin' motherfuckers since the slave ships.”

America's dad, Britain, was a crook, as was their grandpappy Rome before them. It's all one White Empire to me. Since the Roman days they've been corrupting local elites to conscript and oppress their own populations, the method isn't new though madness is.

Kissinger also said that power is the greatest aphrodisiac, before #MeToo was a thing and people could complain that they were actually being raped. America has been rapaciously chewing countries up and spitting them out since WWII. They got a taste for blood money and never relented. Despite Eisenhower's warning. America never turned swords into plowshares, they just went on a rampage. Now America is just gun shop with a McDonald's attached, and a Starbucks for liberals. That's all it is. The US dollar is backed not by gold or goods but by blood. It's literal blood money, and Ukraine has been squeezed for every drop it can give.

America buys governments and if that doesn't work, coups them. Thus America decapitated an elected Ukrainian government in 2014, completely suspended elections under their CIA comedian President, and laundered billions of dollars through the notoriously corrupt country, of which $100 billion is just 'missing'. Now after turning Ukrainian men to ghosts, America is ghosting the country entirely, claiming billions worth of resources and sticking Europe with the bill. Ukraine and Europe aren't even invited to negotiations on their fate, America is completely disregarding them, like proxy prophylactics thrown in the historical dustbin. These cucks thought they were going to be conquerors, but they just watched their own countries get fucked by America.

What was Ukraine's political sin before 2014? Following Jesus's commandment, Love thy neighbor. The Great Satan America can't abide this, so they fomented civil war against Russian-speakers in then Ukraine, banned the Russian Orthodox Church, and left over 15,000 dead before 2022. 2025 is merely the coup de grâce of a long American blood-letting, stabbing Ukraine in the back after throwing them into battle. Now America is openly strip-mining Ukraine for parts without them at the table. As Kissinger's mediocre heir Antony Blinken said, ‘if you're not at the table, you're on the menu.’ Ain't it the truth from the mouths of liars.

So what's on the menu? Same thing that's always on the menu. Blood sausage. Put through the meat grinder by Biden, put on the chopping block by Trump, it's a bipartisan bloodbath. Ukraine was just a blood pump for blood money and now the pump and dump has reached its logical conclusion. Disavowal, dismemberment, and dumping time. America took Ukraine's men, Europe took their women, and now they're being thrown away. I'll say it again because it bears repeating, America was always Ukraine's worst enemy, not Russia. Ukraine wasn't attacked in 2022 by Russia, those places were moreso liberated after the 2014 occupation by America. As any tuk driver on the Colombo streets can tell you, batter an open enemy than a falls friend.

Rift Grows into Chasm as Trump Lays Final Nail in Zelensky's Casket

“Zelensky's situation can be compared to the humiliation of the King of Prussia, who in 1807 was ordered to stand on the bank and wait for Napoleon and Tsar Alexander to meet on a raft on the river in Tilsit.”

Things are moving ahead even more swiftly than imagined. The Ukraine-US honeymoon is officially over, as Trump and Zelensky unleashed scathing new attacks against each other, which can only precipitate fatal repercussions for Zelensky’s career in the near future.

After Zelensky’s critical statements aimed at Trump’s claims of stolen money, Trump fired back with this shocking censure, which called Zelensky a dictator:

Let’s summarize:

1. Zelensky’s pimping off of Ukrainian minerals and rare earths failed, as he was unable to extract the quid-pro-quo necessary from the US

2. Ukraine and US’ relationship has hit rock bottom, with open hostility now present amidst new hints that Trump’s team will launch a full audit of embezzled American funds

3. Zelensky’s political opponents are now ruthlessly attacking him, in particular Poroshenko, with Zaluzhny being staged for the expected presidential ascendance

4. Europe is scrambling to agree on emergency funds to keep the dying Ukrainian project afloat, but their solidarity has strained everyone’s patience

5. Trump’s rumored new three point plan aligns with Putin’s call for the signing of any deals to happen only after a presidential election is held in Ukraine

The above point is particularly important, as it means that internally Trump’s camp is in agreement with Putin’s approach—that no legally binding documentation can be signed by an illegitimate president.

Now the USA blames Ukraine, Zelensky, and hits the ball into Europe’s court. So, Europe, are you ready to go to war with Russia again?

What We Talk About, When We Talk About Talks.

The End may be further away than you think.

As I said earlier, there seems to be little understanding of how complex and inter-dependent the various issues directly related to Ukraine actually are. Here are the ones that occur to me, just on the military/security side:

An agreement for the principle and the modalities of the surrender of UA forces to the Russians. This will be a technical agreement, entirely between the two countries. It might well include arrangements for the exchange of prisoners of war.

An agreement about how to treat foreign personnel, including members of foreign militaries, contractors and mercenaries, on the territory of Ukraine at the time. This would again be a bilateral agreement: the sending states would not have a voice. It could be negotiated as part of (1).

An agreement on the political and military conditions that will be necessary before detailed negotiations with Ukraine and other states can begin, towards a final agreement. These will be essentially those set out by the Russians in 2022, and there will be little scope for negotiation (disarmament, neutrality, ejection of nationalists from government.) Whilst these will take some time to complete, they should at least be agreed and under way before the next stage.

An agreement (probably in Treaty form) on the end-state of relations between Ukraine and Russia and how they will be conducted. (A Joint Ministerial Committee, a Joint Consultative Committee on Defence, for example.) Right of entry and inspection of Russian forces, and mechanisms for ensuring that the demilitarisation of Ukraine is respected.

An Ukraine-Russia agreement on the future presence (or more probably the absence) of non-Russian forces in Ukraine. Defence attaches and perhaps military-to-military visits would presumably be allowed, but that would be about it.

A separate Treaty which would commit NATO and EU powers not to station or deploy forces on the territory of Ukraine, as defined in the text, and perhaps not elsewhere, as well. This would have to be a Treaty between the western states concerned, but there might also be Annexes and subordinate agreements involving Russia/Ukraine, or both.

These are the most important issues directly related to Ukraine, and it will be obvious firstly, that they are deeply connected with each other, and secondly that in principle all except the last are bilateral issues between Ukraine and Russia. From the Russian point of view it would be far better to have a bilateral negotiation, conducted in a common language and among people who in many cases will know each other. They will be very aware that if they let NATO and the EU into the discussion as well, or even allow them to hover in the background whispering into the ears of the Ukrainian delegation, then things will become much more complex. And note that, whilst the Treaty at No 6 is helpful, it’s not essential: Ukraine as a sovereign state can simply ask other countries’ militaries to leave and not come back. The same applies to decisions not to join NATO, or any comparable political demand the Russians might make. And NATO states are free to decide to return stationed forces to their own countries in order to salvage something from the wreckage. This is likely to be a major shock for the western powers, who seem to believe that they are entitled to a status in the negotiations, and the more delusional of whom seem to think that they can provide neutral chairmanship. But the fact is that the Russians have the ball, and they will continue their operations until Ukraine capitulates and agrees to what they want. The West has no counter to such tactics and, the longer things go on, the more disunited the West will become.

You will notice that I haven’t said anything about security guarantees so far, because I think this is a red herring. The obvious reason is that guarantees are not guarantees without the means to enforce them, and the West does not have the means to enforce any guarantees it might give. But there are some more fundamental issues, beginning with what we mean by “security guarantee.”

In its simplest form, such a document is just a political commitment made to another country. The classic modern example is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which gave security assurances to Ukraine in return for its final agreement to give up the nuclear weapons that had been based in the country when it as part of the Soviet Union, and were still there. In return for that undertaking, the Russians, British and Americans agreed to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine,” and to “reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”

This is a purely political “guarantee,” a declarative price exacted by the Ukrainians for agreeing to allow the missiles be repatriated. There is virtually no positive obligation on the three guaranteeing states other than to report to the UN Security Council any attack on Ukraine involving the use of nuclear weapons. (Indeed, the whole agreement was negotiated in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Significantly, the current government in Kiev has made no mention of these assurances, at least that I can find, since 2022: everyone accepts that circumstances change and declarations lose their relevance. There was no way of enforcing the assurances anyway, and that was not the point.

What about the “security guarantee” in the Washington Treaty, then, the famous Article 5? The Ukraine crisis has obliged a number of people to read this Article for the first time, and they have found, to their surprise, that it isn’t a security guarantee at all. Or rather, whilst it says that an attack on one signatory, in a defined geographical area, will be an attack on all, it doesn’t specify what the “all” should do about it. As with most such treaties there is a history: in this case the Europeans wanted a guarantee of military support which the US was not willing to give, thus the rather contorted language of Art 5. On the other hand, the Europeans consoled themselves with the thought that at least there were political assurances which would no doubt weigh with Moscow. Indeed, “security guarantees” have generally been seen by the participants as stabilising and deterrent: even as late as 1914, the Serbs were comforting themselves with the thought that the Austrians would not act against them because that would bring the Russians in, and the Austrians consoled themselves with the belief that the Russians would not come in because that would immediately involve the Prussians …..

Indeed the Austro-Prussian security guarantee, dating ultimately from the secret treaty of 1879, is a good example of what people usually mean when they talk of a “security guarantee.” Under the treaty, Prussia would come to the aid of the Dual Monarchy if it was attacked by Russia. (Technically the reverse was also true, though this was for show.) Yet this arrangement was not based on altruism. If anything, it was designed to control Austria by developing a droit de regard over its foreign policy, with the threat that in practice Prussia would only fulfil its obligations if the Austrians avoided doing something silly. In the end, these alliances did more to provoke war than to deter it, and it was perhaps an atavistic memory of this that made NATO enlargement such a controversial topic in the 1990s. After all, as I heard people from Washington and elsewhere muse, could you in principle commit NATO to backing heaven-knew what extremist government that might arise in, say, Poland in twenty years’ time, for example? The risk of an open-ended commitment where the guarantor becomes the tail and not the dog is one that must be in the minds of any reasonably thoughtful government official thinking about “security guarantees” for Ukraine.

This section would not be complete, though, without mentioning the only security guarantees that have ever really worked: the informal ones. Although the Europeans could not get a firm military guarantee from the US, they achieved much the same result with US forces deployed in Europe. Whilst these forces were never more than a small part of NATO’s mobilised strength, they did mean that the US could not avoid becoming involved in any future war. (“Make sure the first NATO soldier to die is an American!” was the unofficial European motto of the time.) One unnoticed consequence of the massive drawdown of US forces in Europe is that this possibility no longer exists to anything like the same extent. But other nations can play that game as well: since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has hosted large numbers of foreign military personnel on its soil, such that an attacker would be forced to reckon with the involvement of the sending states if Saudi Arabia were attacked. More generally, the use of US personnel as effective human shields is current around the world: for a small nation, a US military base is a good investment for its security. We can assume that the Ukrainians will try something similar, and hope to provoke incidents between western “peacekeeping” troops and the Russians, which they can then exploit. I would like to think that western leaders are sufficiently intelligent to see and avoid the trap, but on the other hand …

The final strand in this argument is the place of Ukraine in international structures, and the future adaptation of those structures themselves. Let’s take NATO first. It seems fairly clear that there is a blocking minority against full membership in any reasonable political timescale. (Though as I have suggested there are Machiavellian reasons why the Russians might actually want to encourage it.) This doesn’t mean the Ukrainians won’t waste negotiating capital by continuing to push, nor that part of the transatlantic ruling elite won’t encourage them, but that’s only half the issue. The most likely western proposal would be some kind of “special status” for Ukraine, with regular talks, visits and joint exercises. Quite what this status would be would be fiercely controversial within NATO itself, and clearly unacceptable to the Russians in almost all cases. But NATO would no doubt reply that its relations with non-members were none of Russia’s business, so it’s doubtful whether Russia would be directly involved in any negotiations. That said, they do of course have many ways of making their opinions known, especially if they are highly influential in Kiev, as is likely to be the case.

The EU is a different case and involves so many assumptions (not least about the future of the Union) that there’s little that can be said without heavy qualification. But in some ways the most interesting question is the political orientation of a postwar Ukraine. The facile assumption that whatever political forces come to power in Kiev will simply carry on where Zelensky left off seems to me very dubious. Under ideal circumstances, EU accession negotiations would take years, and everybody knows that Ukraine is really just after money: the EU’s cohesion funds. This means everybody dipping into their pockets once more, just as all the revelations about large-scale corruption will be coming out. But in any event, it’s not clear that the pro-westerners in Kiev will still have the upper hand politically. In the end, Europe turned out not to be worth much, and there are those who will say it is time to make peace with Moscow. Kiss the hand you cannot bite.

The last point is obviously how the “root causes” of the conflict identified by Putin in the now-famous telephone call are to be addressed. I’m not sure that they will be, or ever can be. To begin with, there is no consensus on what these “root causes” even are, since western states consider the eastward expansion of NATO an internal affair which does not threaten Russia, whilst the Russians consider it the very origin of the conflict. Western states consider that the crisis was caused by Russian expansionism and a desire to recreate the Soviet Union, whilst the Russians consider that they have been responding to the aggressive enlargement of the western bloc.

It’s not obvious how any kind of negotiation can even be started here, or on what basis. Of course a largely symbolic deal (the US pulling some of its remaining troops out of Europe, the Russians making a reciprocal gesture in Ukraine) is always possible, and maybe this is what Trump has in mind. But it clearly will not address any “root causes” as perceived by either side, and it would be quite possible to waste entire years arguing about the subject matter of the negotiations, and even more who would attend, without making any progress at all.

We can assume that the opening proposals of the Russians would be based on their draft treaty texts of December 2021, which NATO rejected without making counter-proposals. At the time, it was fairly obvious that the Russians did not expect NATO to agree to the texts; the idea was presumably to test how far the West was interested in the principle of negotiating on the “root causes” at all. The western response indicated that they were not. Whilst the West is in a much weaker position today, it still seems unlikely that they will agree to negotiate on, or even talk about, the proposals in the December 2021 texts.

For their part, the West will have to struggle to find any common negotiating position at all, not least because both NATO and the EU have become so large and unwieldy that it is almost impossible to identify a collective strategic interest in either organisation. So far, the Russians do not seem to be interested in negotiating with the EU, but by contrast they previously proposed parallel but separate talks with the US and NATO. This delineation has the potential to split the alliance badly (presumably one of the Russian objectives) irrespective of the subject matter, although I suppose you could argue that the alliance has been doing a good job of that anyway, without the need for outside assistance.

But in the end, this may not matter so much. It’s tidier to have a Treaty, but a Treaty is only a document, and if the underlying will to cooperate is not there, it can be more trouble than it’s worth. By contrast, the underlying situation—a stronger Russia, a radically weakened Europe and a weaker and largely absent US— will be an undeniable reality, and that is the context in which politics in Europe will have to take place, irrespective of what “talks” lead to, or what any Treaty might say.

DPA’s Ukraine War Casualties and the Breaking Point By Wyatt Mingji Lim | February 21, 2025 |

Introduction

Three years into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, the war has exacted a staggering toll on both sides. As a journalist embedded in this conflict daily, I’ve witnessed the relentless grind of attritional warfare—Russia’s artillery barrages, Ukraine’s desperate counterattacks, and a manpower crisis pushing Kyiv to the edge.

Working with an analytical partner, Grok3, as my research assistant, we’ve estimated the casualties and assessed Ukraine’s sustainability, focusing on the Kursk front as a microcosm of the broader struggle.

Our findings suggest Ukraine has lost approximately 1.8 million troops (900,000 dead), Russia around 700,000 (250,000 dead), and that Ukraine is teetering on the brink of collapse by mid-2025. Here’s how we got there.

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We have better things to do than make war. Every effort must be made to prevent conflicts. We have to change our way of doing business. Only large, organized groups of common people can change the way The Great Game is played and who the Players are. If we don’t change it now, metastatic, modern techno-industrial civilization will crash, taking billions of people to an early grave. SAAFO (Sit Around And Find Out).